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The shift to increasingly smarter grids will require preparation and planning on the part of a diverse
selection of current and future stakeholders. There are substantive sources of uncertainty that will
impact on the adoption of smarter grid solutions. Risks and uncertainties are placed in one of seven
categories: markets, users, data and information, supply mix, policy, investment conditions, and net-
works. Each of these has the potential to add risk to the planning proﬁles of the stakeholders involved.
Here, UK stakeholders drawn from industry, government, regulators, and academia are canvassed about
potential sources of uncertainty within the UK’s electricity sector and the attendant risks that might be
engendered by them.
© 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with a qualitative discussion of the
many sources of uncertainty concerning the development of a
smart grid (SG) provision within the UK’s electricity industry. It
builds on previous work to identify key issues likely to impact the
need for a smarter grid, the most likely inﬂuencing factors for de-
mand and to set out concerns arising from industry stakeholders.
We use the deﬁnition of SG suggested by the Smart Grids European
Technology Platform: “electricity networks that can intelligently
integrate the behaviour and actions of all users connected to it e
generators, consumers and those that do both e in order to efﬁ-
ciently deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity sup-
plies” [1].
This work synthesises knowledge from in-depth expert in-
terviews and online surveys forming part of a UKERC funded
project to produce scenarios for the development of SG in the UK.
The scenarios [2] are the culmination of a multi-stage process and
have been used to inform the national debate about drivers,nor).barriers, and uncertainty of SG deployment. A key area of the
process was the identiﬁcation of the principal elements of uncer-
tainty and attendant risk arising from the many variables inherent
to SG which will be, to a lesser or greater degree, emergent.
Questions have been raised about the uncertainty of the potential
beneﬁts and risks of unforeseen issues for SG [3]. It was clear from
the interviews in particular that an extended discussion of these
risks was warranted, and that risk and uncertainty need to
explicitly inform the considerations that underlie development and
application of energy policy and regulation. This paper aims to fulﬁl
this gap by analyzing previously unpublished data from this project
with a particular focus on risk and uncertainties arising from the UK
context.
There have been very few broad assessments of the risks for the
development and deployment of SG. For example, although
Rossebø et al. [4]; assessed many sources of risk, their analysis
concentrated on operational parameters expected to be important.
In their modelling, Zio and Aven [5] explicitly recognized invest-
ment, environmental and energy policy, and technical issues. Dig-
mayer and Jakobs [6] conducted a study of experts and laymen into
the risks associated with innovation in direct current grids. The risk
categories identiﬁed by Digmayer and Jakobs were technical,
health-related, economic, environmental, privacy, infrastructure,
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were technical. Lastly, Tuballa and Abundo [7] review some ele-
ments of the deployment of SG.
The UK energy policy environment relating to carbon reduction
and renewable energy deployment is strongly inﬂuenced by EU
commitments, though selection of instruments rests with the UK.
Security is primarily a national concern, while social issues such as
fuel poverty have both national and wider inﬂuences. Security of
supply has become signiﬁcant in shaping the UK generation mix
and this signiﬁcance will continue to grow while old coal and nu-
clear capacity are removed from the mix and the Government at-
tempts to incentivise sufﬁcient new capacity to meet demand. This
will be partially met by new renewable capacity. EU policy requires
20% of energy consumption to come from renewables by 2020 and
the UK agreed an ambitious and legally obligatory target of 15%. It is
not clear what happens if any Member State fails to achieve their
target [8] though substantial ﬁnes cannot be ruled out. Clearly the
negotiated exit of the UK from the EU is likely to impact substan-
tially on the UK’s commitments and any consequences. A newer EU
wide goal of 27% for 2030 is not a legal obligation but may pressure
continuing increases at the national level [9]. It is not currently
clear how the result of the UK referendum on leaving the EU will
impact the UK’s position. The UK has seen steady growth in gen-
eration from renewable energy sources of electricity (RES-E),
particularly onshore and offshore wind and solar [10] and this is
expected to continue, with a widening diversity of sources over
time. Decarbonisation of heat and transport via electriﬁcation may
require a shift to greater electrical demand, impacting on overall
demand and demand volatility. The government and regulator have
acknowledged the challenges of integrating these technologies into
networks and markets and the need for new approaches to
network management.
All GB distribution networks are owned by six distribution
network operators (DNOs). UK DNO R&D expenditure declined
steadily following privatisation in 1990. The continued evolution of
policy and the emergence of a requirement for decarbonisation saw
Government and Ofgem come to view this as unacceptable in the
face of the challenges now faced for continued provision of reliable,
secure and low carbon energy delivery [11e14]. This has led to a
number of policy initiatives to provide new incentives for
investment.
The need to adopt new technologies and new approaches,
potentially in different locations for generation, network manage-
ment and supply and provided by existing companies and perhaps
new market entrants creates substantial new sources of uncer-
tainty for all stakeholders. This paper explores these uncertainties
with a view to identifying the most important concerning future
risk relating to solving the energy trilemma via smart
methodologies.
2. Methodology
We used a multi-step process as part of a wider programme of
work carried out to inform the development of SG scenarios for the
UK [2]. An extensive initial literature review highlighted many
areas of uncertainty and the speciﬁc issues arising from them [15].
A list of UK stakeholder institutions was derived representing
regulators, consumers, and network operators. Eighteen semi-
structured interviews were conducted with experts representing
these key organisations to identify emerging issues and those fac-
tors thought to be the most important in shaping UK SG develop-
ment. The interviews fed development of a two-stage stakeholder
online survey (n¼ 77, n¼ 44); broad characteristics of the partici-
pants are given in Appendix A. We used a ranking system to
identify the factors considered to be most important incharacterising UK SG development. A Delphi Policy process [16]
identiﬁed the key transition points, with results checked for cred-
ibility at an expert workshop with ﬁfteen participants [17]. The
entire programme was overseen by an expert advisory group
comprising ten participants.
The interviews inform the writing throughout this paper and
their content was added to during the following stages of the
applied methodology. The nature of the process, drawing on
additional information to add to a larger model, means more
quantitative assessments using tools such as NVivo is less appro-
priate since it would tend to militate against factors emergent in
the latter part of the process. The quantity and scope of the data
collected means that we focused on the main points arising from
the whole process, with the later elements of the method enabling
us to select for perceived importance from expert stakeholders.
While there it is always possible to overlook or misunderstand
important information, considerable effort wasmade to capture the
widest possible information set, with stakeholders asked to add to
the list of considered factors at every stage. A framework to orga-
nise the information was required as part of the scenario devel-
opment process [2] following the interview stage. Using
information from our literature review and the interviewees, and
the views of our expert advisory group, we developed a classiﬁca-
tion system as follows: markets, users, data and information, sup-
ply mix, policy, investment conditions, and networks. This
represents the most important categories identiﬁed by the stake-
holders. These seven groups were a convenient way of ensuring
consistency through the whole programme and we use them here
for categorisation. Many issues overlap categories and the cate-
gories should not be seen as silos in this approach. Four cross-
cutting issues emerged, and these are introduced ﬁrst to assist
with laying out the evolving situation in the UK electricity sector.
While our method identiﬁed and ranked the areas considered
most important for dictating the likely direction of UK SG devel-
opment to 2050, we qualitatively describe the wider range of
possible sources of uncertainty and the potential risk arising from
them.
3. Risks raised by stakeholders
Independent of whether the interviewees and survey re-
spondents considered an issue to be a driver/barrier or beneﬁt/
pitfall of SG development, each has associated uncertainty. This
implies risk when companies are making decisions about investing
in new capacity, management or in bringing new services or
technologies to market. The meanings of our seven groups, whilst
widely applicable, are conceived in the context of the SG scenarios
developed by Balta-Ozkan et al. [2]. We discuss the cross-cutting
issues ﬁrst, then summarise the key risks, and their associated
uncertainties and drivers in Table 1.
4. Cross-cutting issues
Four issues werementioned in multiple risk groups and warrant
being discussed separately from the categories discussed below.
4.1. The broken value chain
The potential costs and value of smarter energy systems may be
distributed across many stakeholders. However, it is not always
clear which stakeholders will beneﬁt from which actions and how
value might be assigned [18]. This is a type of ‘split-incentive’
problem with the UK smart meter (SM) roll-out a prime example.
Suppliers are bearing the cost for SM, but the usefulness to sup-
pliers is largely limited to automated collection of consumption
Table 1
Summary of the principal sources of uncertainty and risk identiﬁed by interviewees and survey participants.
Category Key Uncertainty Risk Impact
Markets Commonality across the UK Lack of co-operation between suppliers and DNOs SG functionality
Rate of market development Lack of access to markets for small generators and aggregators New energy services
Changing policy Supply market concentration Competition
Value for money for the consumer Lack of customer engagement Demand management
Users Level of behaviour change Lack of customer buy-in re demand-side response Demand management
Customer engagement Failure of smart meter roll-out SG functionality
Data and Information Level of aggregation and availability Lack of data protection and security New energy services
Level of public trust and acceptability Lack of transparency New energy services
Commonality across the UK Inadequate smart meter technology Equality of outcome for consumers
Level and timeliness of access Lack of access for system operators Cost reduction
Supply Mix Planning for reinforcement Curtailment of network access RES-E targets
Planning Lack of public acceptability of RES-E RES-E targets
Policy Changing policy Policy instability RES-E targets
Changing policy Lack of long-term planning CO2 reduction target
Misaligned aims and objectives Lack of coordination between Ofgem and BEIS Competition
Investment Conditions Rate of return Lack of access to capital CO2 reduction target
Future price controls Continued under-investment SG functionality
Rate of return Lack of innovation SG functionality
Networks Rate of increase in RES-E Low rate of decarbonisation RES-E targets
Rate of SG deployment Industry inertia Cost reduction
Rate of SG deployment Intelligence used as a temporary ﬁx Cost reduction
1 In 2016 the Department of Business Innovation, and Skills and the Department
of Energy and Climate Change were merged to form the Department of Business,
Energy, and Industrial Strategy.
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beneﬁt is in network management. However, this depends on the
data that is captured, who can access it and under what conditions,
and the services that it might enable should the network become
more sophisticated. The beneﬁts to suppliers are limited and may
threaten their business models [2,11,19]. This represents a systemic
threat to the wider UK conception of the SG. It has the potential to
limit SG solutions for networks, inhibit innovation, reduce the
potential for dynamic pricing and negatively affect many more
anticipated elements of the smart grid.
Another issue raised was access to value generated from data.
One supplier interviewed emphasised that if the introduction of a
time-of-use tariff (ToU) or signiﬁcant consumer behavioural change
were to be achieved, then a challenge for their sector would be to
ensure the beneﬁt went right across the value chain [20]. This has
signiﬁcant potential to alienate consumers. Stakeholders noted that
supply companies have the most established relationship with
consumers and this might enable them to roll out new SG services.
However, it was noted that UK electricity supply companies are also
amongst the least trusted institutions and the Government has
committed to ensuring that data access does not expand from the
current position [21].
4.2. Public perception and media representation
A number of stakeholders raised the risk of negative public re-
action to smart energy technologies and services. Low levels of
consumer trust in utilities and media criticism of utility operations
and proﬁts were noted by many respondents. It was perceived that
if the media were critical of new and emerging technologies or
applications, it could inhibit uptake. Possible negative coverage
might object to perceived cost, effectiveness, intrusion into the
home and risk of health effects (regardless of evidence). The latter
has already seen negative headlines in some territories and to some
extent in the UK [22e24]. This risk of lack of public acceptance may
affect the cost effectiveness of SM, data and information availability,
and reduce the consumer base for new markets and services.
4.3. Skill shortages
Participants stated that the risk arising from a lack of appro-
priate skills was widespread in the industry. Uncertaintyconcerning which technologies will dominate affects investment in
particular skillsets [25]. A shortage of skills would tend to reduce
options for network operators and push up costs. Some action was
noted e.g. the Power Academy, a scheme to encourage graduates
into electrical engineering appropriate to the power sector, but this
was thought unlikely to be sufﬁcient due to the ageing proﬁle of
many DNO engineers. Other shortfalls included modelling skills
amongst DNOs.
4.4. Institutional issues
Stakeholders were asked about the institutional barriers to UK
SG development and the roles and effectiveness of the Department
of Energy and Climate Change1 (DECC), the Ofﬁce of Gas and
Electricity Markets (Ofgem) and the body they jointly support, the
Smart Grid Forum. There was concern about the absence of high-
level plans for moving the UK forward to its wider energy targets,
the electricity sector reform and the necessity and scope for SG
within this framework. The need for more leadership from Gov-
ernment was cited, speciﬁcally to identify and implement steps
necessary to achieving long-term SG goals. This linked to a wide-
spread concern as to the importance of effective co-ordination of
the system-wide changes necessary to facilitate smarter energy
delivery. To ensure different elementsmoved forward concurrently,
for example, to ensure policy and regulatory change keep pace with
technology.
5. Markets
‘Markets’ refers here to both the continuance of old and the
provision of new energy services, by existing and new actors. This
includes tariffs and business models whichmay be premised on the
use or mediation of energy technologies.
Accessing future lower cost tariffs using demand-side response
(DSR) may require consumers to make available a service to an
energy company. This depends on the willingness and ability of
consumers to change their energy-use behaviour sufﬁciently to
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ment. The risk is in customer willingness to accept that it is
worthwhile to spend time and resources to access tariffs linked to
load-shifting. Both the willingness and capability to engage with
DSR technology would be telling in terms of which consumers
beneﬁt. A key source of risk suggested by some respondents is
consumers rejecting DSR technology, thus rejecting behavioural
change as this would appear trivial in terms of energy and thus cost
savings.
Owen and Ward [26] and Owen et al. [27] suggest that a typical
UK household demand might be able to shift 9% of demand.
Although the UK Energy Demand Research Programme found up to
10% short-term savings in 1e2 person households, the (limited)
longer-term evidence suggested 3% or less [28]. This has the po-
tential to increasewith adoption of technology. Consumers without
‘shiftable’ load may come to subsidise those with such load, since
the latter may eventually be able to take better advantage of dy-
namic pricing. It was noted that some new household tariffs might
be regressive and that tariff structures rewarding shiftability might
add to this since access to new and expensive technology may be
limited to wealthier households. Energy efﬁciency programmes
might most usefully be aimed at those without shiftable load. Since
shiftability may dictate access to lower tariffs political re-
percussions may arise if some consumers can access lower tariffs
while others cannot. Getting the right tariffs to incentivise con-
sumers was also cited as important i.e. a tariff that works for the
consumer rather than just bringing complex tariffs to market. It
was also noted that a current UK political trend of simplifying
consumer tariffs may be at odds with increasing complexity arising
from dynamic pricing or ToU tariffs [29,30].
Load-shifting by industry is already commonplace with large
consumers having bespoke contractual arrangements. Some sec-
tors have high uptake of energy efﬁciency. Involvement in demand
side activity might be determined by processes speciﬁc to each
industry. It was suggested there may be little value in shifting for
some industries and little opportunity in others, while some might
beneﬁt.
Electric vehicles (EVs) may be able to offer bulk energy and
ancillary services (such as frequency support) to distribution net-
works. If properly managed and incentivised EVs might act as a key
element of demand shifting and enhanced ﬂexibility, but this
would require the integration of numerous elements including
willingness on the part of EV owners, DNOs and economics
favouring adoption for both. Peterson et al. [31] and Bishop et al.
[32] present evidence that the economics of battery degradation
makes the provision of vehicle-to-grid (V2G) services unlikely,
though this may change with technological innovation. The emer-
gence of widespread EV adoption may also not emerge on the same
timeframe as storage is needed, Relying on V2G as an important
element of SG thus presents a risk [33].
Other issues considered by interviewees and respondents to be
important were the risk of continued sector fragmentation, lack of
co-operation between suppliers and DNOs, lack of opportunities for
aggregators, lack of access to markets for small generators, and
supply market competition and concentration. Also highlighted
was the slow development of markets for storage, DSR, EVs, and
heat. Uncertainty concerning uptake rates is likely to be highly
signiﬁcant as regards network planning and investment. Risk po-
tential includes over and under investment in networks, with
respective impacts on cost, return to networks or retardation of
growth in renewables.
6. Users
‘Users’ here predominantly means residential, commercial, andsmall industrial consumers. Large industrial users already manage
their risks in more advanced ways. The risks identiﬁed emerge
mainly from the role and engagement of consumers.
Many stakeholders emphasised that the lack of a substantial
uptake of DSR and consumer involvement was a risk to realising full
SG potential, and in particular what might be achieved by demand
management. It was also noted that current potential to shift de-
mand will be limited if the “… visibility of advantages …” is not
apparent. Customer awareness of SG and what it means for them
was summed-up by one respondent as “The degree to which people
can understand and want a more complex relationship with their
energy suppliers”. When asked about consumer engagement
stakeholders had concerns as to whether groups of consumers
would beneﬁt equally from SG. The extent to which consumers
engage with smart technologies and products such as time-varying
tariffs will impact on the provision of new services and system
management methods [34]. Uncertainty as to the level of engage-
ment might only be resolved once action is taken to open up
markets [2] with one respondent suggesting that success may
depend on the implementation strategy.
Stakeholders noted the degree to which residential consumers
will tolerate high prices rather than take action, seeing the un-
knowns arising from this as a signiﬁcant risk to the uptake of de-
mand side measures. The concern of many utility and other
stakeholders was that consumers would decline to become more
proactive and that this put a key element of systemic ﬂexibility at
risk. Uncertainty arises in the uptake of new services and tariffs;
Darby et al. [35] suggest novelty and behaviour change diminish in
a few weeks. Consumer rejection of DSR might be partially miti-
gated by the development of automated DSR measures, with this
dependent onwhether and when these develop and if they can ﬁnd
a route to market. The uncertainty arises from the potential
complexity faced by the residential consumer; commercial con-
sumers with energy management capability may be better able to
take advantage of the new energy services SG will offer. Consumer
disengagement or resistance (scepticism) was considered by survey
respondents as the biggest perceived barrier to the smartening of
the networks. Further work is needed to determine the conse-
quences of increased complexity of decision making on consumer
engagement. Additional uncertainty about DSR arises from the rate
at which automated and non-automated technologies emerge and
the scope of what each can achieve [36]. Respondents identiﬁed a
lack of common technical standards as a risk to widespread
deployment and interoperability, highlighting the need for coor-
dination [37,38].
An additional near-term risk is the scheduling of the UK’s SM
rollout. Approximately 53 million gas and electricity meters are to
be replaced in domestic and small commercial GB premises by
2020 [39]. However, the rollout has already faced repeated delays
and may be at signiﬁcant risk of overrun, with the potential to
become a “costly failure” without Government intervention [40].
Delays to the rollout completion presents risk to the emergence of
opportunities for demand side response, and to addressing the lack
of temporal knowledge about electricity consumption needed to
improve network management. One respondent called for “Joined
up thinking between smart metering and smart grid programme[s]”
though this reﬂected the opinion of numerous stakeholders. This
echoes a wider call from many stakeholders for greater levels of
coordination relating to UK SG development, and particularly for
UK Government to take a stronger role.
7. Data and information
This section is concerned with both historical and real-time data
generation, collection, aggregation, accessibility and billing
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economically effective system for managing large volumes of data,
and the limitations to SM and sensors (due to Government cost-
setting). The three most frequently cited areas for risk by the sur-
vey respondents were data protection and security, privacy gua-
rantees, and public trust and acceptability [17].
A signiﬁcant source of uncertainty is whether data (or infor-
mation) will reach where it can best be used. The level of aggre-
gation, availability, and how rapidly it gets to stakeholders, will
largely determine what services can be made available. This in-
cludes what network operators know about demand and the
rapidity with which they can respond to network issues.
All data generated by SM will be passed to the Data Commu-
nications Company (DCC) for handling and passing on to stake-
holders with access rights (currently suppliers only). This will allow
suppliers to transfer data to and from consumers. The UK SM
implementation strictly limits access to data to maximise customer
privacy. Third party data access is strictly limited, with DNO access
effectively disallowed in the supplier-led rollout. There was a
supposition amongst many respondents that the frequency of data
collection via SM and data aggregation was likely to become freer
over time, with consequent implications for network services. The
rate of change in data access will be a key determinant in how,
when andwhich potential SG features become available [2] but this
is subject to many factors including political will and public buy-in,
making the rate of change unpredictable. Pullinger et al. [41]
conclude that the current UK SM speciﬁcations may mean missed
opportunities and that data resolution may prohibit some pro-
spective uses of SM.
The supplier-led nature of the rollout also emphasises upfront
cost saving against SM capability. Reduced capability risks a loss of
future ﬂexibility; one respondent suggested “There is a real danger
of installing a system which cannot deal with better than half hourly
signals … and that would limit smart grids and require a second
system to go in 5-6 years.”
A further source of uncertainty is that the three UK areas (North,
Central, South) see communications provided by two service pro-
viders using two different communications technologies [42]. The
risk is that different levels of performance may engender different
outcomes for consumers.
Smart meter data has a broad range of possible uses for DNOs as
well as other existing and potentially emergent stakeholders. Balta-
Ozkan et al. [2] and Hall and Foxon [18] noted that there was a
substantive risk for the UK in not recasting DNOs as DSOs or at least
allowing them to adopt some of the characteristics. This evolution
to DSO operations is being considered and may move ahead
[43,44]. The need is for DNOs to have greater responsibility, and the
tools, for system balancing. Denial of increased access to the SM
generated datasets might lower the potential value for SM in aiding
systemic cost reduction.
There was disagreement over the exact form of SM data outputs
that might be usefully made available. Some respondents cast
doubt on the need for real-time data, claiming that many key
beneﬁts were in greater volumes of data which need only be
available on an aggregated or delayed basis. Understanding the
usage landscape is the key point. There was general agreement that
restrictions will be relaxed over time but uncertainty arises from
stakeholders not being clear as towhat datawill be available, when,
and howmuch control an individual stakeholder may exert to limit
access. The risk lies in the lack of signals to trigger investment in
new service provision, particularly for DNOs but also in uptake of
usable options as they emerge in other national contexts.
The curtailment of data access arises from the need to protect
consumer privacy. The UK default is to strongly protect privacy, but
it is possible not all consumers will require this level of protectionand may support some level of reduced privacy in return for po-
tential tariff reduction. Consumer perception may dictate the rate
of revised data access, but decisions will sit with Government and
the regulator [45e47]. Furthermore, a lack of transparency about
data exploitation was considered a risk for public opinion and
media treatment of energy issues. One respondent considered the
key point to be “Consumer conﬁdence in data relating to their energy
use”.
Security is a key issue for SM rollout, and closely linked to pri-
vacy [20]. Stakeholders had speciﬁc concerns about the vulnera-
bility and consumer perception of vulnerability of SM and other
‘internet of energy’ systems to remote or physical interference. The
risk of a lack of data security was raised by many respondents. This
contrasts with access, giving rise to potential conﬂicts and therefore
uncertainty about priorities. It is not possible to estimate howmany
consumers might allow third party access to their data and under
what circumstances.
8. Supply mix
This section is concerned with the evolving roles of ﬂexible,
variable, and inﬂexible generation. There was an expectation that
shifting demand will be an essential element of the future grid
responsiveness to rapid shifts in output from intermittent RES-E
generation and that should consumers decline to do so in bulk it
would require alternatives that would be costly and potentially
more difﬁcult.
Some UK counties are effectively sterilised for new distributed
generation above the domestic scale since reinforcement would
have to be so extensive that costs are prohibitive. The key uncer-
tainty for DNOs is when, where and to what extent reinforcement
of networks should occur. This is predicated on many variables
including growth in demand for generation connection, uptake and
location of heat pumps (HPs) and EVs. Approaches used so far by
DNOs, include prioritised constraint of generators on a ‘last in, ﬁrst
out’ basis and wind farms contracting to shut down when local PV
output is high, that is, curtailment risk is transferred to the
generator. This displaces smart solutions which many respondents
considered would be cheaper than traditional reinforcement in the
long run. Uncertainty in planning for SG arises from the unknown
volume of RES-E resulting from current policy as well as from the
types of technology that may be deployed. Offshore and onshore
wind energy was looking likely to be most signiﬁcant, but further
deployment of onshore wind appears halted [48].
Political, geographical, market, social or technical factors create
uncertainty in how RES-E technologies are adopted across the UK.
The political imperative for RES-E is currently an important enabler
but this does not imply certainty into the future. Respondents
expressed concern over political commitments as well as continued
rates of deployment as a major source of uncertainty. They also
questioned whether it was possible to adequately support both
RES-E and nuclear power from the public purse, citing the potential
for conﬂict over policy frameworks and the ﬂexibility issues around
large-scale use of nuclear. The funding of these two technology
groups from a single source, the ‘Levy Control Framework’, adds to
potential uncertainty as to rates of expansion, with each requiring
different approaches to network investment and future system
balancing. It was noted that regardless of the comparative eco-
nomics, RES-E will be impacted by decisions such as the UK Gov-
ernment’s to provide greater support to nuclear ﬁssion than to the
more mature RES-E technologies. Furthermore, protests against
RES-E occur in many nations for reasons including cost and land-
scape impacts [24,49e52].
The political narrative may change, implying potential variance
in support for the different technologies expected to impact the
2 Price cap regulation of the form Retail Price Index (RPI) minus expected efﬁ-
ciency savings (X).
3 RIIO, Revenue ¼ Incentives þ Innovation þ Outputs UK price controls.
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1. Growing support, as has essentially been the case in most of
Europe in the last decade,
2. Reduced support as with some EU Member States following the
2008 economic downturn, or
3. Rejection of one or more renewable energy technologies in
favour of more general support for CO2 emission reduction and
low carbon technology without the RES-E emphasis.
This might favour increasing gas generation due to concerns
over security and reliability of supply, or other policy initiatives, for
example nuclear generation. The potential for different mixes of
electrical generation e not just of RES-E e was cited as a major
source of uncertainty in planning degrees of smartness [15].
9. Policy
Respondents highlighted the risks due to ineffective policy and
in particular policy instability, not just in terms of changing what is
required from the grid but in terms of the policy framework for
smarter approaches to dealing with them. The impacts of policy on
uncertainty and risk can be highly varied. Arguably, longevity is one
element of good policy but this is too simplistic in terms of the
selection process to achieve speciﬁc goals, possible failure of that
instrument, and potential changes in broader policy aims with
political and public agendas. The failure to create political certainty
may impact on overall installed capacity of low carbon technolo-
gies, and the timeframe over which commissioning occurs. This
uncertainty applies to all RES-E technologies and existing or
emergent competing technologies (such as gas, nuclear and CCS).
A point raised by many respondents was consistency of
approach to long-term planning, particularly between Ofgem and
DECC. Furthermore, the risk of not aligning the goals, objectives,
and strategies of DECC and Ofgem was raised frequently with one
respondent saying: “Both must agree on common aims and objec-
tives”, another accentuating the need for “Linkage across price
controls i.e. incentives for networks to work with each other to deliver
optimal beneﬁts to GB plc”. “Regulatory boundaries for network op-
erators, must liaise better with the customer” typiﬁes the opinion of
many respondents. The absence of more effective coordinationwas
seen by many respondents as potentially restricting the develop-
ment of smarter energy solutions and their integration into the
wider electricity system. Two areas of risk were identiﬁed 1) a
failure by Government and other stakeholders to develop the
mechanisms and institutions to coordinate SG development, and 2)
a failure to do so effectively, by selecting inappropriate policy in-
struments. Despite the formation of the Smart Grid Forum by DECC
and Ofgem there were numerous calls for greater future coordi-
nation, and especially for DECC to take a much stronger role.
Comments such as “Certainty of legislation and regulation so that
investments are secure” summed-up the main issue. The regulatory
system emerging from RIIO creates a new operational environment
for DNOs.
The changes to UK policy in support of large-scale RES-E have
been manifold [11,53e56]. They exemplify some of the wide range
of factors which could impinge on the total volume of intermittent
generation that will be developed on (and off) the UK network, the
type of technology and thus the spatial variation in where it might
occur. Each undermines the ability of the networks to plan for the
future. The risk of lack of clear Government policy and leadership
was summed-up by two typical comments from respondents “We
need a clear, consistent and steady policy on energy production” and
“Government policy for example, a clear position on electriﬁcation as
key (or not) to carbon reduction”. Furthermore, one respondentspeciﬁcally mentioned targets: “Changing targets driven by the EU
and/or national politics” as indicative of the risk of unclear policy
governance.
Concerning UK regulatory policy, the Government and Ofgem
acknowledged that the RPI-X2 system of network regulation
introduced with privatisation in 1990 was incapable of delivering
the innovation needed to integrate smarter grid management and
thus decarbonisation [57,58]. They took steps to address this by:
1. Introducing the RIIO3 system for network incentivisation and
2. Incentivising DNOs to invest in R&D via Registered Power Zones
(RPZ), the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) (both 2005e2010),
the Low Carbon Network Fund (LCNF, 2010e2015) and most
recently the Network Innovation Competition (NIC) and
Network Innovation Allowance (NIA).
While these where seen by the majority of respondents as
positive changes a key criticism from various stakeholders was
summed-up by one respondent as “Regulatory incentives e.g. LCNF
encourages piecemeal solutions without a clear UK strategy”. There
was also some concern that while thesemechanismsmight assist in
creating new network options, there may not be sufﬁcient capital
available to the DNOs to roll them out across the networks. A recent
review of the LCNF agrees that there is no clear path to wider
rollout [59].
Ofgem introduced RIIO as the main instrument for incentivising
the Transmission System Operators (TSOs) and the DNOs to invest
in innovation and then deploy new approaches more deeply into
network operations, something which RPI-X was unable to do. The
aim was to allow greater ﬂexibility for network investment.
Stakeholder opinion varied as to its likely success and the extent to
which it might achieve this aim. It is notable that many respondents
did not consider that the failure of RIIO would rule out smarter
networks [2].
10. Investment conditions
By investment conditions we mainly consider the trade-off be-
tween the cost of capital (cheap or expensive) and the regulatory
investment framework (obstructive or helpful). The issues raised by
participants indicated as most important were uncertain return on
investment (ROI), new modes of ﬁnancing and business models,
and new value delivery mechanisms (e.g. ﬂexibility). Also
mentioned as signiﬁcant risks were the elevated levels of invest-
ment required and the lack of access to capital. An overarching and
recurring themewas long-term regulation and policy (un)certainty.
Issues surrounding the impact of regulation on investment has
been explored by Moises Costa et al. [60].
A speciﬁc risk raised was under-investment by DNOs. Histori-
cally DNOs have focussed on incremental improvements to reduce
costs, with the old RPI-X system of incentivisation set up to reward
this and effectively ruling out more risky approaches. The SG
transition presents a far more complex task.
Participants agreed that both National Grid and the DNOs will
need to take more risks and that more innovation was required.
This will increase costs and require a correspondingly greater ROI.
Several respondents linked ROI to policy, for example “Certainty of
ROI e not government policy, but legally binding contracts” was a
typical comment. The level of additional risk that Ofgem will
tolerate will be signiﬁcant in determining the outcomes of future
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perspective on allowable risk may remain more conservative than
the DNOs, either collectively or individually, retarding innovation. A
number of stakeholders referred to the issue of whether Ofgem
would allow investment ahead of need, notably the allowance of
investment which would not pay off until after the end of the ED1
DPCR in 2023. ED1 states this is permitted, but what Ofgem toler-
ates and what DNOs believe it will tolerate, is a source of
uncertainty.
The RPZ, IFI, LCNF and NIA schemes aimed to address the fall in
DNO R&D activity and have been credited with driving signiﬁcant
steps in revitalising the environment of driving investment in
innovation [61]. However, participants criticised the piecemeal
approach. One stakeholder criticised the IFI for ignoring operational
innovation, and focussing too much on technical solutions.
The locationwere intellectual property rights rests was raised as
a risk arising from the LCNF and its antecedents with the potential
to deter investment. There was general agreement that the
involvement of third-party companies in innovating system ser-
vices was desirable. This has the potential to conﬂict with Ofgem
perspective of capturing the beneﬁt for the public of investment
from regulated network funds. There was concern that Ofgem’s
approach needs to ensure these third-party businesses can beneﬁt
from their own side of the investment. The risk is whether RIIO can
deliver the levels of innovative practice required and the adoption
of new methods; failure may retard growth in multiple areas of
enhanced network smartness.
A source of uncertainty raised by some stakeholders (notably
those with an interest in distribution but not attached to a DNO)
arose from doubts that the DNOs lack the structure to innovate. It
was suggested that some UK DNOs may not have the intellectual
capacity, capable personnel, or the will to drive innovative ap-
proaches. This is linked to issues such as skills shortages, but may
go wider and present an institutional or cultural barrier. The in-
stitutions will need to evolve but at what rate will they need to
invest in changes and what will an effective strategy look like?
11. Networks
We categorised networks as passive, partially active, and fully
active. Much of what has already been reported here outlines
sources of uncertainty for networks. Government decarbonisation
policy drives increases of intermittent and ﬁrm distributed gener-
ation, and new volatile sources of distributed demand. However,
uncertainty as to their capacity and location presents difﬁculties for
TNO/DNOs when making investment decisions. Although not
conﬁned to network operators, industry inertia and resistance was
identiﬁed as a source of risk with one respondent commenting “It’s
comfortable to stay with BAU, least risk, least effort, pleases the
owners”. A key uncertainty is whether to deploy smarter alterna-
tives ahead of immediate requirements or to minimise spending by
reacting ad hoc. A respondent said that DNOs have a “conservative
nature”; whilst this approach may appear as risk averse in the near-
term, it may be a risky stance for the future, in an environment
where many respondents regarded change as essential and with no
possibility of a lasting status quo.
Many respondents highlighted the difﬁculty of making mean-
ingful predictions for network needs after the 2020e2025 period
i.e. the 2015e2023 RIIO-ED1 operating period. Many respondents
identiﬁed a lack of a long-termvision for network development as a
major risk to the successful deployment of SG. Some stakeholders
said that while the Government has a vision for the system in the
medium and long-term, it does not appear to have a staged-plan for
implementation. Another stakeholder suggested Ofgem was
allowing an open marketplace to “let a thousand ﬂowers bloom” butquestioned whether this was an optimal approach. Their view was
that Ofgem should cut the options and engender a more speciﬁc
route forward.
The different low carbon technologies present different risks to
networks. One uncertainty identiﬁed was the uncoordinated
charging of high numbers of EVs. Not only is the EV adoption rate
unpredictable, but it may be gradual or may suddenly change as
price parity is achieved [62]. Once EVs are present they imply risk in
terms of impacts on overall demand proﬁles, in terms of creating
new peaks. Exacerbating existing ones or causing rapid changes in
demand [63,64]. The key uncertainty is the rate of emergence and
of dissemination of technical network solutions but geographical
distribution may also present issues. Balta-Ozkan et al. [2] identi-
ﬁed that the rate of deployment is inﬂuenced by policy, success in
trials, availability of ﬁnance, and whether the technology can be
applied equally in urban and rural settings. This was summed-up by
one respondent as making SG “Complicated from the design
perspective”. These criteria increase the risk of over and under in-
vestment in different locations.
Demand-side management, DSR, and storage (amongst other
solutions) are proposed as tools to enhance network management.
Respondents suggested potential for conﬂict in trading for usage on
markets for capacity and balancing. For example, the potential for
National Grid to be in conﬂict over access to capacity produced
from demand reduction which was contracted to other service
providers.
The ‘utility death spiral’ [65], describes a possible situation of
reducing network use and increasing volumetric charges, pushing
users to seek alternatives and thus creating a vicious circle of
reducing asset utilisation. Increasing the capacity of distributed
generation and introducing smart technologies risks reducing asset
utilisation, and therefore reducing income for TNOs and DNOs.
12. Conclusions and policy implications
This research emerges fromwork to build SG scenarios to 2050,
taking an approach which identiﬁes the main events which will
shape them. Although primarily concerned with the UK many of
our observations of uncertainty and attendant risks will be relevant
to other nations and territories, though the speciﬁcs of any emer-
gent SG will be unique.
Present UK electricity systems are passive, and many risks we
identiﬁed are a consequence of increasing complexity of potential
solutions. A repeated theme in our collected data was the need to
think in terms of systems of steadily increasing smartness pre-
senting SG not as a single artefact or endpoint, but as an ongoing
process. Most outcomes dependent on multiple coordinated (or
potentially uncoordinated) policy and regulatory changes. The key
risk for the UK was seen by many to be the lack of long-term vision.
There was difﬁculty even in predicting past 2020 and this uncer-
tainty is the key source of risk for the many stakeholders involved.
In terms of policy, the risk of continuing inconsistency of aims and
objectives between DECC (now BEIS) and Ofgem was the most
important. Many stakeholders highlighted the need for regulation
e and the regulator e to evolve with technology and market ser-
vices. Long-term regulation and policy certainty is a necessary
condition for investment, and critical for the success of smartening
the grid.
The drivers of the requirement for higher degrees of grid
smartness are major sources of uncertainty in terms of the extent
and pace of change required, as well as factors such as spatial
variation in uptake. These drivers include greater volumes of
intermittent generation on both transmission and distribution
networks and greater volumes of RE sourced in areas not adjacent
to the current network, the level and geographical spread of
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tially wide-scale but unpredictable uptake of HPs and EVs.
One of themost signiﬁcant and difﬁcult to mitigate risks was the
so-called ‘broken-value chain’. Across several aspects of SGs there
may be economic and other beneﬁts in terms of wider societal goals
such as facilitating renewable energy. In a number of cases there is
no obvious way to monetise new technology and services for
whichever stakeholder pays for it, or would like to pay for it. A
similar issue was supplier concern arising from additional network
costs pushing up overall costs, and the impact on consumer bills.
Suppliers are considerably less concerned about demand-side
management so long as supply is not interrupted. The decision to
favour a supplier-led SM rollout was widely seen as having the
potential to substantively delay evolution of the SG. Gradual
relaxation of restrictions on access to dataemost notably for DNOs
and other parties e is expected, but may be slow to occur. Creating
value from consumer data may be problematic and undermine
consumer buy-in.
The need to act to enable the factors that will allow for a smarter
grid is imperative, and it was widely accepted that the status quo
cannot continue. As one stakeholder put it “Doing nothing is the
worst response e it guarantees failure.” We emphasise that current
assumptions about the network will stop applying, and current
solutions will become less effective and more expensive. Assump-
tions must be questioned repeatedly by all relevant stakeholders
with a view to identifying the continued evolution of the sector and
maximising public beneﬁt.
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Appendix A
The participants in the two survey rounds are characterised in
Table A.1. and Table A.2.Table A.1
Summary of the sectors which survey respondents represent.
Sector Round 1 Round 2
Academic 33% 25%
Consultant 9% 0%
Consumer/community interest group 13% 5%
Generator 2% 2%
Network Operator 19% 25%
Policy 5% 2%
Regulator 2% 2%
Supplier 8% 9%
Other 11% 30%
100% 100%Table A.2
Summary of the self-identiﬁed area of expertise of the survey respondents.
Expertise
Business 28% 18%
Economics 3% 11%
Engineering 34% 41%
Social Science 19% 16%
Other 16% 14%
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